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Abstract
A key challenge in censorship-resistant web browsing is
being able to direct legitimate users to redirection proxies
while preventing censors, posing as insiders, from dis-
covering their addresses and blocking them. We propose
a new framework for censorship-resistant web browsing
called CensorSpoofer that addresses this challenge by
exploiting the asymmetric nature of web browsing traf-
fic and making use of IP spoofing. CensorSpoofer de-
couples the upstream and downstream channels, using a
low-bandwidth indirect channel for delivering outbound
requests (URLs) and a high-bandwidth direct channel
for downloading web content. The upstream channel
hides the request contents using steganographic encod-
ing within email or instant messages, whereas the down-
stream channel uses IP address spoofing so that the real
address of the proxies is not revealed either to legiti-
mate users or censors. We built a proof-of-concept proto-
type that uses encrypted VoIP for this downstream chan-
nel and demonstrated the feasibility of using the Censor-
Spoofer framework in a realistic environment.
1 Introduction
Today, the Internet is playing an ever-increasing role in
social and political movements around the world. Ac-
tivists use it to coordinate their activities and to inform
the general people of important information that is not
available via traditional media channels. The role played
by Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, CNN iReport and many
other websites/blogs in the recent events in the Middle
East is a great example of this [29, 43].
The free flow of information and exchange of ideas
on the Internet has been perceived as a serious threat
by repressive regimes. In response, they have imposed
strong censorship on the Internet usage of their citizens.
They monitor, filter, trace, and block data flows using
sophisticated technologies, such as IP address blocking,
DNS hijacking, and deep packet inspection [27, 46]. For
example, the “Great Firewall of China” blocks almost
all popular social networks, such as Facebook, Twitter
and Flickr, and other websites that may provide politi-
cal information contrary to the state’s agenda, such as
Youtube, Wikipedia, BBC News, and CNN [56]. To ex-
ercise control over the Internet, the Chinese government
employs an Internet police force of over 30 000 people
to constantly monitor the citizens’ online activities [41],
and an individual who is caught violating the laws of
Chinese censorship could be forced to pay a fine of up
to $1800 or sent to jail [40].
There are many tools that aim to circumvent such cen-
sorship [1, 2, 35, 44]; a typical approach is to deploy a
redirection proxy that provides access to blocked sites.
Censors are, however, eager to locate such proxies and
block them as well; a particularly powerful approach is
the insider attack, wherein censors pretend to be legiti-
mate users of the service in order to locate and shut down
the proxies. Limiting the amount of information each
user gets and trying to identify compromised insiders can
partially mitigate this attack [47, 48, 52]; however, these
techniques are unlikely to survive a powerful adversary
who can deploy a very large number of corrupt users.
An alternate approach is to never reveal the proxies’ ad-
dress to legitimate users and thus be completely immune
to the insider attack. Some recent work suggests strate-
gically placing special deflection routers at core Internet
ISPs to transparently redirect users’ traffic to the prox-
ies [39, 45, 55]. Such a deployment, however requires
a significant resource investment that is likely to come
only from a (pro-Internet freedom) government agency,
as well as cooperation of large ISPs.
We propose a new approach, CensorSpoofer, that can
be deployed using minimal resources, perhaps volun-
teered by ordinary people interested in promoting Inter-
net freedom. (The Tor project [35] has demonstrated the
feasibility of building a successful service with contribu-
tions from such volunteers.) Our key insight is that it is
possible to use IP address spoofing to send data from the
proxy to a user without revealing its actual origin. Such
a spoofed channel allows communication in a single di-
rection only; however, we can exploit the asymmetric na-
ture of web-browsing traffic, using a low-bandwidth in-
direct channel, such as steganographic instant messages
or email, to communicate requests from the user to the
proxy. To avoid identification by the censor, Censor-
Spoofer mimics an encrypted VoIP session to tunnel the
downstream data, since the VoIP protocol does not re-
quire endpoints to maintain close synchronization and
does not reveal its contents to the censor. We also ex-
plore additional steps that need to be taken to prevent
detection; namely, choosing a plausible fake IP source
address.
To demonstrate the feasibility of CensorSpoofer, we
built a proof-of-concept prototype implementation and
tested it in a real-world environment. Our experiments
show that our prototype can be successfully used for
browsing the web while resisting blocking efforts of the
censors.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We in-
troduce the related work in Section 2. Section 3 presents
the basic concepts, including the threat model and sys-
tem goals. Section 4 describes the framework of Censor-
Spoofer. In Section 5, we elaborate a concrete design of
CensorSpoofer based on VoIP, and analyze its security in
Section 6. Section 7 presents our prototype implementa-
tion and the evaluation results. We conclude in Section 8.
2 Related Work
In response to Internet censorship, many pragmatic sys-
tems such as Dynaweb/freegate [1], Ultrasurf [2], and
Psiphon [44] have been developed to help people by-
pass censorship. All these systems are based on a simple
idea: let the user connect to one of the proxies deployed
outside the censor’s network, which can fetch blocked
webpages for the user. To hide the nature of the traf-
fic, the communications with the proxy are encrypted.
Infranet [36] takes things a step further, embedding the
real communication inside a cover web session, using
covert channels to communicate the request and image
steganography to return the data. However, while escap-
ing detection by outsiders, these designs are vulnerable
to the insider attack, where the censor pretends to be an
ordinary user to learn the location of the proxies and then
block them.
Tor [35] also uses proxies (called bridges, run by
volunteers) to resist censorship, but employs more ad-
vanced strategies to limit the distribution of proxies’ IP
addresses. So far, Tor has tried four different distribution
strategies. First, each user would receive a small subset
of bridges based on their IP address as well as the cur-
rent time. Second, a small subset could be obtained by
sending a request via GMail. These strategies fail to pro-
tect against an adversary who has access to a large num-
ber of IP addresses and GMail accounts; Chinese censors
were able to enumerate all bridges in under a month [3].
(McLachlan and Hopper further showed that open prox-
ies could be used to gain access to a large number of
IP addresses [49]). The third strategy involves distribut-
ing bridge addresses to a few trusted people in censored
countries in an ad hoc manner, who then disseminate this
information to their social networks. Fourth, an individ-
ual can deploy a private bridge and give the bridge’s ad-
dress only to trusted contacts. These methods can resist
bridge discovery but reach only a limitedfraction of the
population of potential bridge users.
Several researchers have tried to design better relay
distribution strategies [37, 47, 48, 52] that aim to identify
users who are likely to lead to a relay being blocked us-
ing past history and directing new relay information to-
wards other users. However, these designs are not likely
to withstand a censor who controls a large number of cor-
rupt users.
Another school of research on censorship circumven-
tion tries to fundamentally resist the insider attack, i.e.,
tolerating any fraction of corrupted users. The idea is
to hide the relay’s IP from any user and therefore the
censors. One way to achieve that is to utilize indirect
channels, i.e., relaying the traffic sent to/by the relay
through one or more intermediate nodes. For example,
MailMyWeb [4] and FOE [5] utilize Email as the indi-
rect channel. For these systems, users are required to
be able to access foreign servers that support encryp-
tion (e.g., Gmail), in order to avoid being detected by
the censor. Nevertheless, considering the Chinese gov-
ernment once temporarily blocked Gmail [30], we can
envision the censor would again block the few special
email providers, once finding out they are popularly used
to bypass censorship.
It is important to note that, while an indirect channel
is also used in CensorSpoofer, we only use it for send-
ing outbound messages (e.g., URLs), which are usually
very small (especially after encoding URLs into small
numbers) and easy to hide into any indirect channel us-
ing steganography. This allows us to obviate the need for
special servers (e.g., external Email providers support-
ing encryption) to provide a secured and high-bandwidth
indirect channel. Consequently, the cost of blocking
the outbound channel of CensorSpoofer is significantly
higher: the censor has to block all overseas indirect com-
munication (e.g., overseas Email and IM) even though
the users only use the local Email and IM providers con-
trolled by the censor.
More recently, researchers proposed several
infrastructure-assisted circumvention systems, including
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Telex [55], Decoy routing [45], and Cirripede [39].
Although these systems can support low-latency com-
munication and perfectly resist the insider attack, they
require a significant investment of effort by core Internet
ISPs. By contrast, CensorSpoofer is an infrastructure-
independent circumvention system, allowing individuals
to deploy their own anti-censorship systems with-
out requiring any additional support from network
infrastructure.
Instead of aiming to provide low-latency communi-
cation, some anti-censorship systems are designed to
achieve censorship-resistant content sharing and/or dis-
tribution. For example, some works leverage peer-to-
peer (P2P) networks to provide privacy-preserving file
sharing, e.g., Freenet [33], membership concealing over-
lay network [53], and darknet [6, 50]. Collage [31] let
users stealthily exchange censored information with an
external relay via a website that can host user-generated
content (e.g., Flickr) using steganography.
3 Concept
3.1 Threat Model
We consider a state-level adversary (i.e., the censor), who
controls the network infrastructure under its jurisdiction.
The censor has sophisticated capabilities of IP filtering,
deep packet inspection, and DNS hijacking, and can po-
tentially monitor, block, alter, and inject traffic anywhere
within or on the boarder of its network. However, the
censor is motivated to allow citizens to normally access
basic Internet services, such as IM, email and VoIP, as
blocking such services would lead to economic lesses
and political pressure. More specifically, we assume the
censor is unwilling to interfere with the Internet connec-
tions of a user, e.g., an ongoing VoIP conversation, unless
it has evidence that a particular connection is being used
for bypassing censorship.
Furthermore, we assume the censor generally allows
people to use common encryption protocols to protect
their online privacy, e.g., SRTP [23] for secure VoIP
communication. Thus far, this assumption has held
true for most existing cases of Internet censorship, and
the use of encrypted protocols such as SSL/TLS have
formed the foundation of most existing anti-censorship
systems [1,2,4,5,35,39,44,45,55]. Once again, blocking
encrypted traffic reduces the security of normal citizens
using the Internet for personal or business reasons, and
thus censors are motivated to allow such traffic through.
There have been important exceptions to this, including
Iran’s blocking of all encrypted traffic prior to the 33rd
anniversary of the Islamic Revolution [28] and Egypt’s
complete disconnection of the Internet in response to na-
tionwide protests [34]. Such drastic censorship requires
fundamentally different circumvention approaches that
are out of scope of our work.
We assume the censor can utilize its governmental
power to force local IM, Email, and VoIP providers to
censor their users’ communication. We also assume that
the censor can block any foreign Internet website or ser-
vice, such as an email or instant messaging provider, if it
has reason to believe that it is being used to circumvent
censorship. The censor can rent hosts outside of its own
network, but otherwise has no power to monitor or con-
trol traffic outside its borders. Finally, we assume that
the censor has sufficient resources to launch successful
insider attacks, and thus is aware of the same details of
the circumvention system as are known to ordinary users.
Similar to many existing systems [31,35,36,39,45,55],
our approach requires that users run specialized circum-
vention software on their computers. We assume that
users are able to obtain authentic copies of the software
without alerting the government to this fact through some
form of out-of-band communication. (We acknowledge,
however, that secure and reliable mechanisms for dis-
tributing such software are an important area of future
research.)
3.2 System Goals
CensorSpoofer aims to achieve the following goals:
Unblockability: The censor should not be able to block
CensorSpoofer without incurring unacceptable costs.
Unobservability: The censor should not be able to tell
whether a user is using CensorSpoofer or not.
Perfect resistance to insider attack: The censor should
not be able to break unblockability or unobservability of
CensorSpoofer even if nearly all users are corrupted.
Low latency: CensorSpoofer should be able to provide
low-latency communication, such as web browsing, with
acceptable quality of service.
Deployability: CensorSpoofer should be deployable
by people with limited resources, without requiring any
support from network infrastructure.
4 CensorSpoofer Framework
4.1 Overview
In censored countries, users cannot visit blocked web-
sites directly and have to connect to some external relays
to access these websites. These relays’ IP addresses are
exposed to users who connect to them, and therefore can
be easily blocked by the censor who colludes with cor-
rupted users. A natural solution to this is to employ indi-
rect channels to hide the relay’ IP. For example, MailMy-
Web [4] and FOE [5] use email as the indirect channel for
which the intermediate nodes are Email servers.
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Figure 1: The CensorSpoofer framework. The user pretends to communicate with an external dummy host legitimately,
and sends URLs to the spoofer via a low-bandwidth indirect channel (e.g., steganographic IM/email). The spoofer
fetches blocked webpages according to the received URLs, and injects censored data into the downstream flow towards
the user by spoofing the dummy host’s IP.
To carry voluminous downstream traffic (e.g., web
content), the indirect channel must have high bandwidth.
This requirement excludes steganographic indirect chan-
nels, such as steganographic IM/email. As a result, the
circumvention system has to rely on an encrypted indi-
rect channel so as to utilize full capacity of the indirect
channel while avoiding content-based blocking. This re-
quires the intermediate nodes of the indirect channel to
support encryption (e.g., TLS/SSL) and reside outside
the censor’s network (to avoid eavesdropping by cor-
rupted intermediate nodes). Currently, only a few email
providers can meet this requirement: Gmail, Hotmail,
and Yahoo! Mail. However, due to their limited user base
in the censored country, the censor could simply block
them altogether, as witness when Gmail was blocked in
China in 2011 [30].
Our insights. We notice that for web browsing, the
outbound traffic (e.g., URLs) is much lighter-weight than
the inbound traffic. If an indirect channel is only used to
send outbound messages, high bandwidth is no longer
required for the indirect channel. This allows us to use
any indirect channel with steganography to transmit out-
bound data. Besides, by using steganography, users can
even use local IM or email providers that potentially col-
lude with the censor to access our circumvention system
without being detected. The elimination of requiring spe-
cial servers to provide the indirect channel makes it sub-
stantially harder for the censor to block our circumven-
tion system as all overseas Email and IM communication
has to be prohibited.
As for the inbound channel, since the relay’s IP (i.e.,
source IP) is not used in packet routing, we can adopt IP
spoofing to conceal the relay’s IP address. This elimi-
nates the need for an indirect channel to hide the relay’s
IP, allowing us to use direct channels, which are more
common and higher-bandwidth, to send inbound traffic.
Our design. Based on these insights, we design
a new circumvention framework for web browsing,
which uses asymmetric communication with separate in-
bound/outbound channels. In particular, a user who re-
quires circumvention service first starts or pretends to
start a legitimate communication session (e.g., a VoIP
call) with a dummy host residing outside the censor’s
network, and the relay (called spoofer) injects censored
data into the downstream flow sent to the user by spoof-
ing the dummy host’s IP, so that the censor believes the
user is legitimately communicating with the dummy host
only. The dummy host does not need to actively coop-
erate with the user or the spoofer, but should look le-
gitimate to the censor, e.g., its port for VoIP should be
open if the cover session is a VoIP call. Meanwhile,
the user sends outbound messages containing URLs to
the spoofer through a low-bandwidth indirect channel,
such as steganographic IM/Email. An illustration of the
framework is provided in Figure 1.
Next, we discuss the inbound and outbound channels
in more details.
4.2 Inbound Channel
1) To conceal the spoofer’s IP address, we apply IP
spoofing in the downstream flow. Then, the first ques-
tion is what kind of traffic (TCP or UDP) is suitable for
IP spoofing?
Generally, hijacking TCP with IP spoofing is diffi-
cult. In TCP, end hosts maintain connection state and
acknowledge received data. Suppose the client has es-
tablished a TCP connection with the dummy host, and
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the spoofer knows the dummy host’s IP address and se-
quence number and tries to inject packets containing cen-
sored data into the downstream flow. First of all, the
TCP connection with the dummy host must be kept alive;
otherwise, the dummy host will send RST packets in re-
sponse to the client’s packets, which can be easily de-
tected by the censor. In addition, if the spoofer sends
more data to the client than the dummy host (i.e., the se-
quence number of the spoofer is higher than that of the
dummy host), the censor can detect the inconsistency of
the sequence numbers as long as the dummy host sends
any packet to the client1. Thus, the spoofer has to use
the sequence numbers that have already been used by the
dummy host (i.e., injecting packets as “resent packets”).
However, in this case a censor with packet-recording ca-
pability can detect the injected packets by comparing the
contents of packets with the same sequence number.
In contrast, UDP is a connectionless protocol and eas-
ier to hijack. Unlike TCP, end hosts of UDP do not main-
tain any connection state or acknowledge received data.
Hence, if the dummy host remains “quiet” and the client
and the spoofer cooperate closely by sharing initial infor-
mation and following a proper traffic pattern, it is feasi-
ble to deceive a smart censor into believing that the client
is legitimately communicating with the dummy host over
a duplex UDP channel. In this work, we focus on UDP
traffic for IP spoofing. We present a concrete example of
hijacking UDP in Section 5.
2) To ensure unobservability, the communication be-
tween the client and the spoofer (and the dummy host)
should look like a normal UDP session of a legitimate
Internet application. So, the second question is what car-
rier applications should be used?
UDP is mainly used for time-sensitive applications,
such as VoIP, video conferencing, multi-player online
games, webcam chat, online TV, etc. These applications
usually have high-bandwidth channels. Some other UDP
applications, such as DNS and SNMP, have very limited
bandwidth and thus are not suitable to carry voluminous
downstream traffic.
We can further divide these applications into two
classes based on their communication manner: (1)
client-to-server communication, e.g., multi-players on-
line games and online TV, and (2) client-to-client com-
munication, e.g., VoIP and video conferencing. To
achieve better robustness to blocking, we prefer the ap-
plications in the second class, since for these applications
the pool of dummy hosts is significantly larger (e.g., the
dummy hosts could be any VoIP client on the Internet),
making it much harder to block them altogether.
1An active censor can check the dummy host’s current sequence
number by replaying a client’s packet that is outside the dummy host’s
receiving window; in this case the dummy host will reply an ACK
packet containing its current sequence number.
3) In CensorSpoofer, we use a dummy host as a cover
to stealthily transmit censored data. The third question is
how to select dummy hosts?
The selection of dummy hosts is decided by the car-
rier application. For example, if the carrier application is
VoIP, then each dummy host should be a potential VoIP
client. Note that an active censor can use port scanning
(e.g., using nmap [7]) to check if a dummy host is actu-
ally running the application, i.e., listening on a particular
port (e.g., port 5060 for SIP-based VoIP). In response, we
can use port scanning as well to obtain the list of dummy
hosts. According to our experience, a dummy host is
“quiet” (i.e., not sending any reply packet) to incom-
ing UDP packets sent to a specific port, as long as this
port is not “closed” on the dummy host. In many cases,
port scanning is unable to determine whether a particu-
lar application is running on a target machine, since the
target machine could be behind a firewall that is config-
ured to filter probe packets. For example, nmap returns
“open|filtered” or “closed|filtered” when it cannot tell
whether the port is open/closed or the probe is filtered.
This ambiguity plays in our favor as it makes a larger
number of hosts appear to be plausible VoIP endpoints.
4) Finally, we note that not all Internet hosts can
launch IP spoofing. Some ASes apply ingress and/or
egress filtering to limit IP spoofing. The MIT ANA
Spoofer project [8] has collected a wide range of IP
spoofing test results, showing that over 400 ASes (22%)
and 88.7M IPs (15.7%) can be used to launch IP spoof-
ing. Therefore, we need to deploy our spoofer in the
ASes where IP spoofing is not prohibited. We can utilize
some tools, such as nmap and the spoofing tester devel-
oped by the Spoofer project [8], to test whether a host
can perform IP spoofing.
4.3 Outbound Channel
To send outbound requests, we use a steganographic
channel embedded in communications such as IM or
email. Note that URLs are typically quite short and can
be easily embedded into a small number of messages.
Communication requirements can be further reduced by
using a pre-agreed list of censored URLs and sending
just the index of the desired site. Likewise, navigation
within a site can use relative link numbering, request-
ing, e.g., the 3rd link from the front page of www.cnn.
com. Note that steganography requires the use of a se-
cret encoding key to remain invisible; this process can be
made resilient to insider attacks by negotiating a separate
key with each user. Specific steganographic construc-
tions and their security are beyond the scope of this work.
An important challenge that we must address, however,
is the possibility that the censor will perform blocking
based on the recipient’s IM identifier or email address;
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we discuss a solution in Section 5.2.
5 A Design of CensorSpoofer
In this section, we present a design of CensorSpoofer
based on VoIP, although it is possible to build it upon
other UDP applications, e.g., video chat. We start with
providing background knowledge about VoIP systems.
5.1 Background of SIP-based VoIP
VoIP is an Internet service that transmits Voice over IP-
based networks. It employs session control protocols,
such as SIP, MGCP, and H.323, to setup and tear down
calls. SIP is one of the most widely-used VoIP signal
protocols, because of its light weight. In this work, we
focus on SIP-based VoIP systems.
SIP is an application layer protocol. It can run on ei-
ther UDP or TCP. There are three main elements in SIP
systems: user agents, location services, and servers.
• User agents are the end devices in a SIP network.
They originate SIP requests to establish media ses-
sion, and send and receive media. A user agent can
be a physical SIP phone or SIP client software run-
ning on a computer (also called softphone). A user
agent needs a SIP ID, which is signed up at a SIP
provider, in order to make and receive SIP calls.
• Location service is a database that contains infor-
mation about users, such as SIP IDs, the latest lo-
gin IP addresses, preferences, etc. Location services
generally do not interact directly with user agents.
• Servers are intermediary devices that are located
within the SIP network and assist user agents in
session establishment. There are two main types
of SIP servers: registrar and proxy. A registrar re-
ceives SIP registration requests and updates the user
agent’s information (such as the login IP address)
into the location service. A SIP proxy receives SIP
requests from a user agent or another proxy and for-
wards the request to another location.
Here is an example to show how a user (Al-
ice) calls another user (Bob). Suppose Alice has
signed up a SIP ID alice@atlanta.com at the SIP
provider atlanta.com, and Bob got his SIP ID
bob@biloxi.com from biloxi.com, and Alice knows
Bob’s SIP ID.
When Bob comes online, he first sends a registration
request to the registrar of biloxi.comwith its current IP
address. So does Alice to register herself at the registrar
of atlanta.com.
INVITE M1
INVITE M2
INVITE M4Trying M3
Trying M5
Ringing M6
Ringing M7
Ringing M8
OK M9
OK M10
OK M11
ACK M13
Media Session
BYE M15
OK M16
Alice Bobatlanta.com
proxy
biloxi.com
proxy
ACK M12
ACK M14
Figure 2: An example of a SIP session (registrars and
location services are not shown).
The SIP call initialization process is shown in Fig-
ure 2. First, Alice sends an INVITE message (M1),
which contains her SIP ID and IP address, Bob’s SIP
ID, her supported media codecs, etc., to the proxy of
atlanta.com (note that at this point Alice does not
know Bob’s IP address). The local proxy performs a
DNS lookup to find the IP address of the proxy serv-
ing Bob’s domain, i.e., biloxi.com, and then forwards
the INVITE message (M2) to the remote proxy. At the
meantime, the local proxy sends a Trying response (M3)
back to Alice, indicating that the INVITE has been re-
ceived and is being routed to the destination. Upon re-
ceiving the INVITE message, the proxy of biloxi.com
sends a query to its location service to look up the reg-
istered IP address of Bob, and then it forwards the IN-
VITE message (M4) to Bob. The user agent of Bob
sends a Ringing response (M6) to the proxy indicating
that Bob’s phone is ringed. If Bob decides to answer the
phone, an OK message containing Bob’s current IP (M9)
is sent and forwarded back to Alice; otherwise, a Reject
response is returned (not shown in the figure). From the
received OK message, Alice learns Bob’s IP address, and
sends an ACK message towards Bob (M12, M13, M14).
At this point, the SIP initialization session is done, and
Alice and Bob start the media session by sending each
other audio data directly. At the end of the media session,
either party can send a BYE message (M15) to close the
call.
The media session uses Real-time Transport Pro-
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tocol (RTP) to transmit audio data, and Real-time
Transport Control Protocol (RTCP) to provide out-
of-band statistic and control information for the RTP
flow. Both RTP and RTCP run on top of UDP. VoIP
clients can use SRTP/SRTCP [23]—an encrypted ver-
sion of RTP/RTCP—to encrypt their voice communica-
tion. SRTP/SRTCP only requires the user to install a user
agent that supports RTP/RTCP encryption, and does not
require the VoIP servers to support encryption. This im-
plies that the user can use any VoIP provider, including
local providers that collude with the censor, to access our
circumvention system. Currently, there are many VoIP
clients supporting SRTP and/or ZRTP, such as Blink [9],
SFLphone [10], Zfone [11], and PJSUA [12]. The en-
cryption key for SRTP/SRTCP can be either established
beforehand, e.g., via MIKEY [20], or negotiated on the
fly using ZRTP [26]. In this work, we consider using
pre-established keys for SRTP/SRTCP.
5.2 Censorship Circumvention
A sketch of the circumvention procedure is as follows.
The client first initializes a SIP session with the spoofer
by sending out a normal INVITE message. Upon re-
ceiving the INVITE message, the spoofer randomly se-
lects a dummy host and replies with a manipulated OK
message that looks like originating from the dummy
host. When the OK message arrives, the client starts to
send encrypted RTP/RTCP packets with random content
to the dummy host, and the spoofer starts to send en-
crypted RTP/RTCP packets to the client by spoofing the
dummy host’s IP address. Meanwhile, the client sends
URLs through a steganographic IM/Email channel to the
spoofer. The spoofer fetches the webpages, puts them
into RTP packet payloads and sends them to the client.
To terminate the circumvention session, the client sends a
termination signal to the spoofer over the outbound chan-
nel, and then the spoofer sends a BYE message (with IP
spoofing) to the client to close the call.
5.2.1 Invitation-based Bootstrapping
Since the censor can learn the callee SIP ID from the
INVITE message, the user cannot use a common callee
SIP ID to call the spoofer (otherwise, he/she will be de-
tected once the censor learns the spoofer’s SIP ID from
corrupted users). There is a similar issue for the stegano-
graphic IM/Email channel: the censor can detect users
sending IMs or Emails to the spoofer based on the recip-
ient’s IM ID or Email address (generally referred to as
upstream ID).
To address this, we let the spoofer use a unique callee
SIP ID and a unique upstream ID to communicate with
each client. Hence, the SIP IDs and upstream IDs of
the spoofer learned by corrupted users cannot be used to
detect honest users. To avoid the bottleneck of having the
spoofer create a large number of SIP and upstream IDs
by itself, we have each client sign up a callee SIP ID and
an upstream ID on behalf of the spoofer, and give them to
the spoofer when joining the system. We achieve this by
introducing an invitation-based bootstrapping process.
In particular, if a user Alice wants to join the cir-
cumvention system, she needs an invitation and help
from an existing CensorSpoofer user (say Bob). Alice
must trust Bob (e.g., Bob is a friend of Alice); other-
wise, Bob could simply report Alice to the censor for at-
tempting to access circumvention service. (We note that
similar invitation-based bootstrapping strategies have al-
ready been adopted by some real-world circumvention
systems, e.g., Psiphon [44].) First, Alice needs to sign
up two SIP IDs and two upstream IDs. One pair of SIP
ID and upstream ID is for herself, and can be obtained
from her local SIP and IM/Email providers which po-
tentially collude with the censor. The other pair is for
the spoofer, and must be signed up at abroad SIP and
IM/Email providers (not necessarily supporting encryp-
tion). If all external SIP, IM, or Email providers are
blocked by the censor, Alice can ask Bob to use his
already-established circumvention channels to sign up
these IDs for her. Then, Alice encrypts the following
registration information with the spoofer’s public key:
caller SIP ID | master key |
callee SIP ID | passwd for callee SIP ID |
upstream ID | passwd for upstream ID
The master secret is used to derive SRTP/SRTCP ses-
sion keys (and the key for the steganographic outbound
channel if necessary), and the passwords are for the
spoofer to login the callee SIP ID and the upstream ID.
To complete the bootstrapping, Alice needs to deliver
the encrypted registration information to the spoofer. Al-
ice could ask Bob to forward the whole registration in-
formation to the spoofer through his outbound channel.
To reduce the bandwidth consumption of Bob’s outbound
channel, Alice could let Bob only forward the encrypted
upstream SIP ID and password to the spoofer; once her
outbound channel is established, she can send the rest
registration information to the spoofer by herself.
Note that our unique-ID-assignment strategy cannot
be applied to existing relay-based circumvention sys-
tems, such as Tor, to improve the robustness against the
insider attack. This is because the “ID” in CensorSpoofer
is an application-level ID, and it is fairly easy to get a
large number of them; whereas, in Tor, the “ID” that a
user use to communication with the relay is the relay’s IP
address, and IP address is commonly viewed as a scarce
resource and it is hard to get a large number of spare IP
addresses.
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For the spoofer, it needs to run multiple SIP IDs
and multiple upstream IDs at the same time (possibly
with a common service provider). In general, IM/Email
servers and SIP registrars do not limit the number of ac-
counts registered from a common IP address, because
it is possible that multiple legitimate clients are behind
a NAT sharing the same IP address. We did some
tests on two real-world VoIP providers ekiga.net and
mixvoip.comwith 100 different SIP IDs running on one
of our lab machines, respectively. It turned out for both
providers, all these SIP IDs can be registered and receive
calls successfully. We also did tests on Gtalk with 10
different accounts on the same machine and all of them
worked properly.
5.2.2 Manipulating the OK Message
Once the bootstrapping is done, the client can initialize a
circumvention session by calling the spoofer using the
previously registered callee SIP ID. In the SIP proto-
col, the callee’s IP address is written into the OK mes-
sage (more specifically, the enclosed SDP message [22],
which is used to negotiate the session format, such as
codecs, ports, IP, etc.), and later is used by the caller
to send RTP/RTCP packets to the callee. Since the OK
message can be eavesdropped by the censor, the spoofer
cannot put its real IP into the OK message.
For this, we use a trick to hide the spoofer’s IP ad-
dress. According to the IETF standards [22, 24], the
SDP messages are not checked by SIP proxies. This
means the spoofer can put the dummy host’s IP, instead
of its own IP, into the OK message, without influenc-
ing the OK message being forwarded back to the client.
Since the registered IP of the callee SIP ID (kept by the
location service of the spoofer’s VoIP provider) is un-
known to the censor, the manipulated OK message is
still plausible to the censor. To verify the feasibility of
replacing the spoofer’s IP address in the OK message
in practice, we utilized netfilter queue [13] to mod-
ify the OK message on the fly, and tested it with two
VoIP providers ekiga.net and mixvoip.com and an
unmodified VoIP softphone PJSUA [12]. We found all
manipulated OK messages were successfully delivered
to the client and the client-side softphone started to send
RTP/RTCP packets to the replaced IP after receiving the
OK message.
5.2.3 Selection of Dummy Hosts
A SIP client listens on TCP and/or UDP port 5060 for
SIP signalling, and the ports for RTP/RTCP are selected
randomly on the fly (usually RTP uses an even port
and RTCP uses the next higher odd port). To check
the legitimacy of a dummy host, the censor could ap-
Input: IP range // outside censored networks
Output: dum hosts
dum hosts ←{} ;
unaccepted ←{closed,host seems down} ;
foreach ip ∈ IP range do
if port scan(ip,sip port) /∈ unaccepted then
rt p port ← rand even port() ;
rtcp port ← rt p port + 1 ;
if port scan(ip,rt p port) /∈ unaccepted and
port scan(ip,rtcp port) /∈ unaccepted then
add 〈ip,rt p port〉 to dum hosts ;
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: Port scanning algorithm to find a list of
candidate dummy hosts
ply port scanning to test if the ports used by VoIP are
open on the dummy host. In response, we can also
use port scanning to get the list of dummy hosts. As
we mentioned before, in many cases, port scanning can
only return an ambiguous result. For nmap [7] (the
state-of-the-art port scanning tool), the possible prob-
ing results include “open”, “closed”, “filtered”, “un-
filtered”, “open|filtered”, “closed|filtered”, and “host
seems down”. Only “closed” can clearly tell the cen-
sor a particular application is not running on the target
machine. When the status is “host seems down”, it is
very likely that the target host is offline. For safety, we
exclude “host seems down” from the acceptable probing
states. Therefore, we let the spoofer periodically run port
scanning with randomly selected IPs outside the censor’s
network to get a list of acceptable 〈ip,rt p port〉 (see Al-
gorithm 1).
Another strategy for the censor to check legitimacy of
the dummy host is to compute the AS path of the spoof-
ing traffic and compare it against the observed entry point
of the inbound traffic (i.e., where it enters the censor’s
network). If the dummy host is located far from the
spoofer, it is likely that the entry point of the spoofing
traffic is inconsistent with its claimed AS path. To deal
with this, we first use traceroute to compute the AS
path from the spoofer to the client (called reference AS
path), and then choose a dummy host whose predicted
AS path to the client is consistent with the reference AS
path with respect to their entry points. Researchers have
proposed several AS-path inference algorithms with high
predication accuracy (such as [51]).
In addition, since the port status on a probed host may
change over time, we let the spoofer keep track of the
previously found dummy hosts and maintain a list of
alive dummy hosts. When a circumvention request ar-
rives, the spoofer picks a dummy host from the alive-host
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list, and keeps checking the VoIP ports of this dummy
host during the circumvention session. If the spoofer de-
tects any port of SIP, RTP and RTCP on the dummy host
is closed before the circumvention session ends, it sends
a BYE message to the client immediately to terminate the
SIP session. If the client wants to presume the circum-
vention session, it needs to initialize another SIP session
with the spoofer.
5.2.4 Traffic Pattern and Bandwidth
To resist traffic-pattern-analysis attack, the client and the
spoofer should follow certain patterns of legitimate VoIP
traffic when sending RTP/RTCP packets. For VoIP, both
RTP and RTCP packets are of the same size and sent pe-
riodically2. The packet size and sending frequency are
defined by the audio codec, which is negotiated during
the SIP initialization session. The codec determines the
bandwidth of the inbound channel (∼ pkt size× f req).
Some codecs that are used to achieve better voice qual-
ity can provide higher bandwidth (e.g., 64 Kbps with
G.711), while others provide lower bandwidth (e.g., 16
Kbps with iLBC). Note that the same bandwidth is con-
sumed at the dummy host, due to the dummy traffic
sent by the client. We can use some bandwidth esti-
mation tools (e.g., packet-trains [42]) to figure out
how much available bandwidth the dummy host has, and
based on that, we choose an appropriate codec to avoid
consuming too much bandwidth of the dummy host.
5.2.5 Packet Loss
UDP does not provide reliable transmission. A RTP
packet containing data of a blocked webpage could be
lost during transmission, causing failure of reconstruct-
ing the webpage at the client. To tolerate packet loss,
we can use Forward Error Correction (FEC) codes (e.g.,
Reed-Solomon code [21]) inside the inbound channel, so
that the client can recover the webpage as long as a cer-
tain number of packets are received.
6 Security Analysis
We next discuss the security properties of CensorSpoofer
against potential passive and active attacks.
6.1 Geolocation Analysis
Since the callee’s SIP ID and IP address contained in the
OK message are transmitted in plaintext, a sophisticated
2Some softphones have the option of Voice Activity Detection
(VAD), which can avoid unnecessary coding and transmission of si-
lence voice data. With VAD, the RTP packet size and sending interval
may variate. In this work, we assume no VAD is used at the spoofer or
the client for simplicity.
censor could record all the IP addresses that have been
bound to a particular callee SIP ID over time, and try to
discover abnormality based on the geolocations of these
IPs. For instance, a SIP ID would look suspicious if its
registered IPs for two closely conducted SIP sessions are
geographically far from each other (e.g., the SIP ID is
first registered with an IP in U.S. and 1 hour later it is
registered again with another IP in Europe).
To deal with this, instead of picking dummy hosts ran-
domly, the spoofer can choose a set of dummy hosts,
which are geographically close, for a particular callee
SIP ID, according to an IP-geolocation database (such
as [14]). In particular, for the first-time use of a
callee SIP ID, the spoofer randomly selects a primary
dummy host for it, and keeps this information in the user
database. For subsequent SIP sessions calling this SIP
ID, the spoofer preferentially assigns its primary dummy
host for it. If the port status of the primary dummy
host becomes “closed”, the spoofer then preferentially
chooses a dummy host from those that have been as-
signed to this SIP ID (which are also stored in the user
database). If none of them is available, the spoofer se-
lects a new dummy host that is geographically close to
the primary dummy host for this SIP ID. (Note that the
spoofer should make sure that a particular dummy host
is not being used by two or more callee SIP IDs at the
same time.)
Furthermore, each user can create multiple callee SIP
IDs. When a circumvention session is carried out very
close to the previous one, or when the spoofer cannot
find a suitable dummy host for a callee SIP ID, the user
can choose another callee SIP ID instead.
6.2 User Agent & Operating System (OS)
Fingerprinting
The SIP protocol defines the basic formats of SIP mes-
sages, but allows user agents (i.e., softphones or SIP
phones) to add optional information into the SIP mes-
sages, such as the user’s display name, timestamps, and
the software/hardware information of the user agent. In
addition, SIP messages (e.g., INVITE and OK) contain
some random identifiers, such as “To tag” and “From
tag”, which are generated by the user agent with self-
defined length. Additionally, the SIP messages also con-
tain the codecs that are supported by the user agent.
The above information allows a sophisticated censor
to fingerprint a particular user agent. As a result, the
censor may detect users communicating with the spoofer
based on the user-agent fingerprint of the spoofer. To ad-
dress this, the spoofer can create a number of user-agent
profiles based on the popular SIP phones and softphones,
and assign one of them to each callee SIP ID. For a SIP
session calling a particular SIP ID, the spoofer generates
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corresponding SIP messages based on the user-agent pro-
file of the callee SIP ID.
Note that some softphones are only available for cer-
tain OSes. For example, SFLphone [10] can only be used
on Linux, and Blink [9] is only available for Windows
and Mac users. Hence, a sophisticated censor can use OS
fingerprinting tools (e.g., the OS detection of nmap [7]) to
check if the dummy host’s OS is consistent with its user
agent (learnt from the user-agent fingerprint). To handle
this, the spoofer can also use the OS fingerprinting tool
to detect the dummy host’s OS, and based on that, assign
an appropriate user-agent profile.
6.3 Traffic Manipulation
The censor can also try to manipulate traffic flows in or-
der to detect users accessing our circumvention system.
In anonymous communication systems (e.g.,
Tor [35]), an attacker could use traffic analysis to
detect if two relays are on the same path of a flow, by
injecting a specific traffic pattern at one relay (e.g., by
delaying certain packets) and detecting the same pattern
at the other relay [54]. If applying the same attacking
philosophy to CensorSpoofer, the censor could delay
the packets sent by the user, and detect if there are any
changes of the traffic pattern in the downstream flow.
However, this attack is based on the precondition that the
flows sent and received by the remote host are correlated,
and this is not true for VoIP, since each VoIP client sends
RTP/RTCP packets periodically, independent of the
incoming flow.
Another way to manipulate traffic is to drop pack-
ets. Since the spoofer does not actually receive any
RTP/RTCP packets from the user, the censor can drop
the user’s packets without even being noticed by either
the spoofer or the user. The softphones and SIP phones
can tolerate a small number of random packet loss; but
if there are no RTP/RTCP packets received for a certain
period of time (e.g., 30 seconds), they will drop the call
automatically. Hence, a censor can adopt the following
strategy to detect a CensorSpoofer user: it blocks all the
RTP/RTCP packets sent to the callee, and checks if the
callee still sends packets to the client after a certain pe-
riod of time. However, the price of mounting this attack
is very high. Since the censor is unable to tell which
flow carries censored data, it has to drop all VoIP flows
unselectively, causing normal VoIP conversations being
interrupted.
The censor can also alter, reorder, inject or replay
RTP/RTCP packets sent to the callee (i.e., the dummy
host). However, since a normal VoIP client running the
SRTP protocol can simply filter the invalid packets, such
attacks cannot help the censor detect if the callee is a real
SIP client or a dummy host.
6.4 SIP Message Manipulation
The censor can attempt to manipulate SIP messages. For
instance, the censor can manipulate the IP of the callee
(i.e., the dummy host) in the OK message, and then
check if there are any RTP/RTCP packets sent to the
user. Similar to the packet-dropping attack, this attack
will make legitimate users unable to make and receive
VoIP calls.
To resist this attack, the spoofer can compute a short
keyed hash of the dummy host’s IP (and other impor-
tant data if any) using the SRTP session key, and put the
hash value into some random identifiers (e.g., “To Tag”)
in the OK message. The user who knows the session
key can use the embedded hash to verify the integrity of
the dummy host’s IP. If the user detects the OK message
is manipulated, it will terminate the SIP session by not
sending an ACK response.
7 Prototype and Evaluation
In this section, we briefly describe our prototype imple-
mentation, and report the evaluation results. We refer
interested readers to Appendix I for detailed description
of our prototype implementation.
7.1 Sketch of Prototype Implementation
The spoofer prototype has four components: a SIP mes-
sage handler, a RTP/RTCP transmitter, an outbound mes-
sage receiver, and a prefetching proxy. For the SIP mes-
sage handler, we used tcpdump to create user-agent pro-
files, and netfilter queue [13] to capture incoming
INVITE messages. We used UDP raw sockets to send
RTP/RTCP packets. The raw socket allows us to put
an arbitrary IP into the source IP field in the IP header.
We implemented a XOR-based encoder/decoder to han-
dle packet loss. For this prototype, we used Gtalk as
the outbound channel, although our system in no way
depends on encrypted indirect channels like Gtalk. We
implemented a simple Gtalk client using a python API
xmpppy [15] to send and receive outbound messages. For
ordinary web browsing, a user’s web browser sends sep-
arate HTTP requests for the html file of the webpage as
well as the objects embedded in the webpage. To mini-
mize the number of messages sent through the outbound
channel, we implemented a prefetching proxy for the
spoofer, which can parse the html file to figure out the
missing objects and fetch these objects on behalf of the
client, so that the client only needs to send a single HTTP
request to the spoofer to download a webpage. Our im-
plementation was based on an open-source layout engine
QtWebKit [16].
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Figure 3: Performance evaluation.
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Figure 4: Performance comparison.
As for the client, we implemented a client-side HTTP
proxy to handle the HTTP requests made by the user’s
browser and the HTTP responses received from the RTP
channel. The proxy only forwards the first HTTP re-
quest to the spoofer via the Gtalk channel and caches
the HTTP request-response pairs in memory; when the
browser makes a HTTP request, the proxy will serve the
browser the appropriate HTTP responses from the mem-
ory. We implemented a minimal browser application –
simply a wrapper around QtWebPage – to load the web-
pages and provide statistic information for evaluation.
7.2 Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of CensorSpoofer in a real-
istic environment, and compare it with other circumven-
tion systems. Then, we measure the selection of dummy
hosts.
Table 1: Bandwidths for different VoIP codecs.
Codec BW of inbound Consumed BW of
channel (Kbps) dummy host (Kbps)
G.711 64 87.2
G.722-64 64 87.2
G.726-40 40 54.7
iLBC 15.6 26.6
7.2.1 Performance Evaluation
The spoofer was deployed on an Emulab machine (lo-
cated in Utah, U.S.), which has 3.0 GHz 64-bit Duel
Core CPU with 1 GB cache and 2 GB of RAM and runs
Ubuntu 11. We deployed 8 clients on Planetlab, which
are all located in China. Since we aim to evaluate the per-
formance of our system, we let the clients share the same
dummy host, which was randomly selected and located
in Illinois, U.S.
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Figure 5: Stability of dummy hosts.
Table 2: Usable dummy hosts based on AS paths (Spoofer-ASN = 38).
DST-ASN % of direct IPs Entry-ASN # of usable dummy hosts % of usable dummy hosts
4134 39.4% 4134 225 100%
4837 19.8% 4839 225 100%
9394 8.3% 9394 217 96.4%
4538 7.1% 23911 41 18.2%
To handle packet loss, we made the spoofer add a re-
dundant XOR packet for every 10 packets. We chose the
most commonly used VoIP codecs G.726-40, G.722-64,
G.711, and iLBC, and set the corresponding RTP packet
size and sending interval according to the standard speci-
fications in [32]. The bandwidth provided by each codec
and the consumed bandwidth of the dummy host are pro-
vided in Table 1.
Each client was configured to repeated download the
webpage of wikipedia.org (which is about 160 KB)
for 20 times. For each download, we measured the down-
loading time for the entire webpage and the html file
of the webpage. (Note that once the html file is down-
loaded, the user’s web browser will display the basic
frame and the text of the webpage, and the user can
start reading the text-based content.) We found that the
clients were able to successfully download the page of
wikipedia.org (which was blocked in China) using
CensorSpoofer. The results of downloading times are
provided in Figure 3. We can see that with the codec
G.711 or G.722-64, the downloading time for the whole
page was 27 seconds, but it only took about 6 seconds to
load the html file.
In addition, we compared the performance of Censor-
Spoofer with that of existing circumvention systems. We
installed a Tor client on one of the Planetlab nodes,
and made it connect to a bridge in U.S. to download the
webpage of wikipedia.org for 50 times. Additionally,
we ran the same experiment by making the client connect
to a public proxy of NetShade3 (a proxy-based circum-
vention & anonymity system), which is located in U.S.
Figure 4 shows that it did take longer time for Censor-
Spoofer to download the pages than the other two cir-
cumvention systems, but the downloading time for small
web contents, such as html files, for CensorSpoofer is
still acceptable.
We note that the performance of CensorSpoofer can be
improved by fixing some limitations of our current im-
plementation. For example, our current prototype of the
spoofer does not start sending any packet to the client un-
til it has fully received a html file or an object. We believe
removing these limitations can reduce the downloading
time. Similarly, the current prototype of the client-side
proxy does not deliver HTTP data to the client’s web
browser until the full html file or object is downloaded.
The can be provided by pushing received data to the
browser instantly.
In addition, we notice that the main performance bot-
tleneck of CensorSpoofer is the RTP channel that carries
the voice data. We believe by using a higher-bandwidth
downstream channel, such as video streaming, the per-
formance of CensorSpoofer can be much improved.
3http://www.raynersoftware.com/netshade/
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7.2.2 Measurement of Dummy-Host Selection
To evaluate the easiness of finding dummy hosts, we im-
plemented the port scanning algorithm (i.e., Algorithm 1
in Section 5.2.3) using nmap [7]. We considered China
as the censored country. We randomly selected 10 000
IPs from the entire IP space, which are located outside
China, according to an IP-geolocation database [14]. We
finally found 1213 IPs that can meet our requirements,
and the percentage of satisfactory IPs is 12.1%. This in-
dicates that there are a potentially large number of usable
dummy hosts on the Internet.
Furthermore, we computed the percentage of appro-
priate dummy hosts for a specific client based on their
predicted AS paths to the client. We implemented a
widely used AS path inference algorithm [51] that is
based on AS relationships [38]. We considered the top
four ASes in China in terms of the number of covered
direct IPs (according to [25]), and selected a random
IP (i.e., the client) from each of the ASes. We ran-
domly picked 225 dummy hosts out of the 1213 can-
didate dummy hosts, and computed the AS paths be-
tween them and the four clients. Then, we compared
the output paths with the AS paths from the spoofer to
the clients (computed using traceroute), and filtered
the dummy hosts with inconsistent entry points. The re-
sults are shown in Table 2. We can see that for a specific
client, there are enough dummy hosts to use, especially
for the clients located in large ASes.
In addition, we measured the stability of dummy hosts
over time. Ideally, the dummy host should stay “us-
able” (i.e., none of its VoIP ports becomes “closed” or
“host seems down”) during the circumvention session,
so that the user does not need to re-initialize the SIP ses-
sion to change dummy hosts. To justify this, we ran-
domly selected 100 dummy hosts out of the 1213 can-
didate dummy hosts, kept sending RTP packets to each
of them and checking the states of their VoIP ports. Fig-
ure 5(a) depicts the CDF of length of staying usable for
a dummy host. We can see that over 90% dummy hosts
can stay usable for more than 2 hours, and over 80% can
stay usable for longer than 6 hours. This means in most
cases, the users only need to establish one SIP session
throughout their web browsing.
We also measured the stability of dummy hosts over
a longer period of time. We kept track of the states of
100 randomly selected dummy hosts from Feb. 9th 2012
to Feb. 16th 2012. To simulate the practical scenario
when the dummy hosts are used by our system to re-
ceive VoIP traffic, we kept sending RTP packets to each
dummy host periodically, with 1-hour sending period and
1-hour sleeping period. Figure 5(b) depicts the number
of usable dummy hosts along the time. We can see that
the total number of dummy hosts is almost stable, indi-
cating that the overall pool of candidate dummy nodes
does not shrink over time.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a new circumvention
framework—CensorSpoofer—that exploits the asym-
metric nature of web browsing. CensorSpoofer decou-
ples the upstream and downstream channels, using a
low-bandwidth indirect channel for delivering outbound
requests (URLs) and a high-bandwidth direct channel
for downloading web content. The upstream channel
hides the request contents using steganographic encod-
ing within email or instant messages, whereas the down-
stream channel uses IP address spoofing so that the real
address of the proxies is not revealed either to legitimate
users or censors. Unlike some existing circumvention
systems, CensorSpoofer does not require any additional
support from network infrastructure, and allows individ-
uals to implement the system only at end hosts. We
implemented a proof-of-concept prototype for Censor-
Spoofer, and evaluated it in a realistic environment. The
experimental results showed that CensorSpoofer has rea-
sonable performance for real-world usage.
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A Appendix I: Prototype Details
A.1 The Spoofer
Our spoofer prototype is mainly composed of the
following components: a SIP message handler, a
RTP/RTCP transmitter, an outbound message receiver,
and a prefetching proxy.
A.1.1 SIP Message Handler
We use PJSUA v1.12 [12] as an out-of-box tool to
register the callee SIP IDs. We choose PJSUA be-
cause we can easily register multiple SIP IDs using
the --config-file option with different configuration
files. To prevent the user-agent fingerprinting attack,
we use tcpdump to pre-record the OK response mes-
sages generated by different softphones, and use them
as templates to generate corresponding OK messages to
response to different INVITE messages. In our imple-
mentation, we create a profile based on the softphone of
Ekiga [17].
When starting the spoofer, the SIP message han-
dler first launches PJSUA to register callee SIP IDs,
so that the SIP proxies can forward INVITE messages
related with these SIP IDs to the spoofer. We use
netfilter queue [13] to capture incoming INVITE
messages. (Since PJSUA requires to bind port 5060, we
do not create a socket bound to port 5060 to receive IN-
VITE messages.) For each received INVITE message,
the SIP message handler generates a corresponding OK
message, by extracting the session related information
(such as the caller’s SIP ID, IP address, tags, etc.) from
the INVITE message and putting them and the IP ad-
dress of a dummy host into the pre-recorded OK mes-
sage. Once the OK message is sent out, the spoofer cre-
ates a thread for the RTP/RTCP transmitter for this client.
A.1.2 RTP/RTCP Transmitter
The RTP/RTCP transmitter needs to send RTP and RTCP
packets periodically with IP spoofing. For this, we use
a UDP raw socket, which allows us to put an arbitrary
IP into the source IP field in the IP header. To en-
crypt RTP/RTCP packets, we use AES-128 of OpenSSL
v1.0.0 [18] with a pre-shared key. Since the sending fre-
quency of RTCP packets is much lower than that of RTP
packets, we only use RTP packets to carry censored data
and send RTCP packets with randomly generated pay-
loads.
To handle packet loss, we implemented a simple XOR-
based encoder and decoder. The RTP/RTCP transmit-
ter partitions the flow of each task (i.e., downloading a
particular webpage) into fixed-sized data blocks (smaller
than the RTP payload), and multiplex the blocks of dif-
ferent tasks of the same client into one stream, which
is further divided into groups of size λ (e.g., λ = 10
blocks). For each group, the transmitter generates a re-
dundant block by XORing all λ blocks in the group, so
that any λ out of the λ + 1 blocks are sufficient to re-
cover the whole group. Whenever a RTP packet needs
to be sent, the transmitter checks if there are any avail-
able blocks (including XOR blocks) in the buffer for this
client. If so, it writes one block into the RTP payload
and sends it out; otherwise, the RTP packet is stuffed
with random data.
Note that some blocks may contain data less than their
capacity (e.g., the last block of a task), and blocks may
arrive at the client in different order than being sent out;
besides, the client should be able to differentiate blocks
for different tasks. To handle these, we use the first 4
bytes of the RTP payload to carry a block sequence num-
ber (2 bytes), a task number (1 byte), and block size (1
byte). These fields are encrypted together with the rest
RTP payload.
A.1.3 Outbound Message Receiver
For this prototype, we use Gtalk as the outbound chan-
nel, although our system in no way depends on encrypted
indirect channels like Gtalk. Gtalk employs XMPP [19]
as the transmission protocol. We implemented a sim-
ple Gtalk client using a python API xmpppy [15] to
send and receive Gtalk messages. The Gtalk ID of the
spoofer is pre-given to the user. Each Gtalk message
contains a URL, the user’s IP address, and a task number
(also contained in the RTP payload). The outbound mes-
sage receiver forwards the received Gtalk message to the
prefetching proxy by sending a UDP packet, and then
the prefetching proxy will start downloading the web-
page according to the URL.
A.1.4 Prefetching Proxy
For normal web browsing, a user inputs a URL in its web
browser, and the browser will then fetch the html file of
the webpage as well as the objects used by the webpage,
such as figures and video clips. The browser downloads
each object by sending a separate HTTP request.
Since each CensorSpoofer client only sends one URL
(instead of separate HTTP requests) to the spoofer, the
spoofer needs to prefetch the whole webpage on the be-
half of the client. This means that the spoofer needs to
first download the html file of the webpage, parse the
html file to figure out the missing objects, and then send
separate HTTP requests to fetch these objects, and finally
send all the downloaded data to the client over the RTP
channel.
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We built a prefetching proxy (PFP) for this purpose.
Instead of implementing a html parser and fetching em-
bedded objects (which are essentially the operations of a
web browser) from scratch, we use an open-source lay-
out engine QtWebKit [16], which is a port of the pop-
ular WebKit4 layout engine into the Qt application de-
velopment framework. We choose QtWebKit because it
provides a simple QtWebPage type that significantly re-
duces our development effort. Given a URL to load, a
QtWebPage performs all the necessary network opera-
tions, including parsing, Javascript execution, etc., in or-
der to render the webpage. The PFP obtains all the raw
HTTP responses for HTTP requests that the QtWebPage
makes. As soon as PFP receives a full HTTP response,
it sends the request-response pair to the client over the
RTP channel. When the QtWebPage finishes loading the
entire webpage, the PFP sends an “End-of-Page” marker
to the client, to inform that there will be no more request-
response pair for this webpage.
There are some limitations with our current PFP im-
plementation. The QtWebPage on the PFP is a distinct
browser instance from the client’s browser, so the HTTP
requests it generates are likely different from what the
client’s browser generates. This is a certainty in the
presence of cookies because the cookies of the client’s
browser and all HTTP request headers are not forwarded
to the PFP. Another limitation is that the current PFP dis-
ables Javascript on the QtWebPage because Javascript
execution might generate additional HTTP requests af-
ter the page has “finished” loading (as notified by the
QtWebPage), making it hard for the PFP to determine
when to send the “End-of-Page” marker.
A.2 The Client
To avoid the censor detecting CensorSpoofer users based
on the fingerprint of their softphones, we do not imple-
ment our own softphone for the clients; instead, we let
the client use any existing softphone to access Censor-
Spoofer (i.e., for registration and sending SIP messages).
Again, we use PJSUA for the client prototype without
special reasons.
When running the client, PJSUA is first launched to
register the user’s SIP ID. Note that most softphones (in-
cluding PJSUA) do not support making calls outside the
user interfaces. In order to call the spoofer automatically
inside our client program, we use tcpdump to pre-record
the INVITE and ACK messages, and send them during
the ongoing SIP initialization session with the spoofer
(the ACK message needs to be updated according to the
OK message before being sent out).
Once the SIP initialization is done, the client creates
a UDP socket to receive RTP/RTCP packets from the
4http://www.webkit.org/
spoofer and send RTP/RTCP packets to the dummy host.
The client uses the pre-shared key to decrypt received
packets and stores the decrypted blocks into a buffer.
Once a sufficient number of blocks in a group are re-
ceived, the client uses the XOR-based decoder to recover
the original group.
We implemented a client-side HTTP proxy (CSP) to
handle the HTTP requests made by the user’s browser
and the HTTP responses received from the RTP chan-
nel. When the CSP receives the first HTTP request for a
page, it forwards the URL of the page to the spoofer via
the Gtalk channel, but will not forward subsequent re-
quests for other objects of the page. Instead, the CSP will
“collect” in memory the HTTP request-response pairs re-
ceived from the spoofer, and will serve to the client’s
browser the appropriate HTTP responses from its mem-
ory when the browser makes a HTTP request.
We note that any web browser supporting HTTP prox-
ies, such as Mozilla Firefox5, can use the CSP be-
cause the CSP provides an HTTP proxy compliant in-
terface. Therefore, we do not have to modify existing
web browsers or implement a new one. However, for
ease of automating experiments, we implement a min-
imal browser application (totalling 150 lines of code)
that is simply a wrapper around QtWebPage to load the
webpages. This browser application also outputs various
statistics useful for our evaluation.
5http://www.mozilla.com/firefox
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